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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
mindful that first amendment freedoms require "breathing space" to sur-
vive, the Court was reluctant to depart from the traditional interpretations
of the case-or-controversy doctrine that have evolved from article III.
More specifically, a litigant must show that his rights are in imminent
danger from a particular, well-defined governmental restriction, even though
the real threat may derive from the fact that the restriction is not particular,
but rather unknowable, insidious, or pervasive. Since Tatum was without
precedent on its facts, however, it is possible that more experience with
these facts in future litigations 5 will lead the Court to a more flexible
approach to "chilling effect" claims in cases of surveillance of civilian
activities.
David J. Mathews
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - DOUBLE JEOPARDY - STATE PROSECU-
TION BARRED AFTER FEDERAL PROSECUTION FOR SAME OFFENSE -
BURDEN ON STATE TO SHOW SUBSTANTIALLY DIFFERENT INTERESTS
FROM THOSE OF INITIAL PROSECUTING JURISDICTION.
Commonwealth v. Mills (Pa. 1971)
Appellant Mills was arrested for the robbery of a federally insured
savings and loan association in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.' He was
indicted by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania for state criminal code
violations of carrying a concealed deadly weapon, unlawfully carrying a
firearm without a license, and aggravated robbery.2 He was also indicted
by the United States for federal code violations of bank robbery and
assault.3 Mills pleaded guilty to the federal indictment and was sentenced
85. For examples of the effect of time on changing the Court's approach to a
problem, compare Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44 (1943), with Griswold v. Con-
necticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) ; Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946), with Baker
v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
1. 447 Pa. 163, 165, 286 A.2d 638, 639 (1971).
2. Ronald Mills was indicted under sections 4416, 4704, and 4628 of the Pennsyl-
vania Criminal Code. The indictment under section 4416 for carrying a concealed
deadly weapon was not attacked on appeal because sentence had been suspended on this
charge following Mill's guilty plea. Section 4704 provides in part:
Whoever robs another, or steals any property from the person of another, or
assaults any person with intent to rob him, or by menace or force, demands any
property of another, with intent to steal the same, is guilty of a felony ....
PA. STAT. tit. 18, § 4704 (1963). Section 4628 provides:
No person shall carry a firearm in any vehicle or concealed on or about his
person, except in his place of abode or fixed place of business, without a license
therefor as hereinafter provided.
PA. STAT. tit. 18, § 4628(e) (Supp. 1972).
3. See 18 U.S.C. § 2113 (1970) which provides in part:
(b) Whoever takes and carries away, with intent to steal or purloin, any
property or money or any other thing of value exceeding $100 belonging to, or in
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to five years imprisonment. He subsequently filed a motion in Pennsylvania
state court to dismiss the indictments there pending on the grounds that
successive prosecutions violated the proscription against double jeopardy.4
Upon a denial of the motion, appellant pleaded guilty and was sentenced
to pay a fine, costs of prosecution, and to five years probation to begin
at the expiration of the federal sentence.5
On appeal to the superior court, the orders of the trial court were
affirmed. 6 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania granted allocatur and
reversed the superior court's orders, holding that a second prosecution
and imposition of sentence will only be allowed if there is a showing
by the Commonwealth that its interests were not sufficiently protected in
the initial prosecution. Commonwealth v. Mills, 447 Pa. 163, 286 A.2d 638
(1971).
The proscription against double jeopardy is found in the fifth amend-
ment to the United States Constitution 7 and has been held to apply to
the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 8
This proscription is founded on the fundamental notion of fairness9 and
has found acceptance, in some form, in virtually every known system of
law throughout recorded history.10 Without it, not only could an individual
be constantly threatened with multiple prosecutions for the same offense,
the care, custody, control, management, or possession of any bank, credit union,
or any savings and loan asociation, shall be fined not more than $5,000 or im-
prisoned not more than ten years, or both ....
(d) W;Whoever, in committing, or in attempting to commit, any offense defined
[herein], or puts in jeopardy the life of any person by the use of a dangerous
weapon or device, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more
than twenty-five years, or both.
4. The plea of a former conviction (autrefois convict) or a former acquittal
(autrefois acquit) for the same offense is a proper defense to a criminal charge pur-
suant to section 464 of the Pennsylvania Criminal Procedure Code. PA. STAT. tit. 19,
§ 464 (1964). But it was unclear in the instant case whether the plea of autrefois
convict had been properly pleaded in defense. A motion to quash would have been
improper. Commonwealth v. Hahn, 63 Pa. D. & C. 269 (C.P. 1949). However, since
there was no indication of waiver in the record, the superior court held that it would
review the denial of the plea. Commonwealth v. Mills, 217 Pa. Super. 269, 278 n.3,
269 A.2d 322, 327 n.3 (1970), citing Commonwealth v. Yahnert, 216 Pa. Super. 159,
264 A.2d 180 (1970).
5. 477 Pa. at 166, 286 A.2d at 639.
6. 217 Pa. Super. 269, 269 A.2d 322 (1970), rev'd, 477 Pa. 163, 286 A.2d 638
(1971).
7. Specifically, the amendment provides:
No person . . . shall . . . be subject for the same offense to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb ....
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
8. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
9. See Sigler, A History of Double Jeopardy, 7 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 283 (1963)
Note, Double Prosecution by State and Federal Governments: Another Exercise in
Federalism, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1538, 1539-40 (1967).
10. The concept of a proscription against double jeopardy developed as part of
the common law and had also been a part of the early Roman and Greek law. M.
FRIEDLAND, DOUBLE JEOPARDY 5-17 (1969). Further, a study of the development of
the laws within the British Empire reveals the broad international acceptance of the
doctrine. Grant, Successive Prosecutions by State and Nation: Common Law and
British Empire Comparisons, 4 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 1 (1956).
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but also the concept of the finality of court judgments would be
emasculated."
The early history of the United States indicates that the judiciary
opposed successive prosecutions based upon the double jeopardy proscrip-
tion.12  However, beginning in 1847, the United States Supreme Court,
in Fox v. Ohio,13 United States v. Marigold,14 and Moore v. Illinois15
a succession of cases upholding the constitutionality of concurrent federal
and state criminal jurisdiction - articulated the concept of dual sovereignty.
Although not faced directly with the issue of successive prosecution,'6
the opinions in these cases provided strong dicta supporting the dual
sovereignty doctrine.
By reviewing Fox, Marigold, and Moore in chronological sequence,
the progression of the development of the dual sovereignty doctrine can
clearly be seen. In Fox, the Court said that even assuming that the fifth
amendment proscription against double jeopardy applied to the states:
[T]his would by no means justify the conclusion, that offences falling
within the competency of different authorities to restrain or punish
them would not properly be subjected to the consequences which those
authorities might ordain and affix to their perpetration. 7
Marigold, citing the Fox case, reinforced this concept in almost identical
terms.' 8 And in Moore, the Supreme Court articulated the fully developed
concept that:
Every citizen of the United States is also a citizen of a State or
territory. He may be said to owe allegiance to two sovereigns, and
11. Fisher, Double Jeopardy, Two Sovereignties and the Intruding Constitution,
28 U. CI. L. REV. 591, 592-94 (1961). The author discussed the social value of cer-
tainty of criminal judgments and the inequities which would result from a policy
allowing multiple prosecutions. Id. at 593.
12. In Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1 (1820), the Court, in dictum,
rejected the doctrines of successive prosecutions. Id. at 31. In the same year, the
Court also recognized the availability of a plea of autrefois acquit between interna-
tional sovereigns. United States v. Furlong, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 184 (1820)
(dictum). See Newman, Double Jeopardy and the Problem of Successive Prosecution:
A Suggested Solution, 34 S. CAL. L. REV. 252, 252-58 (1961).
13. 46 U.S. (5 How.) 410 (1847).
14. 50 U.S. (9 How.) 560 (1850).
15. 55 U.S. (14 How.) 13 (1852).
16. In Fox, a prosecution and conviction in state court tinder a state law for
counterfeiting was upheld despite the existence of a federal law prohibiting the same
acts. 46 U.S. (5 How.) at 423. Marigold upheld a federal prosecution and conviction
in federal court under the federal counterfeiting statute notwithstanding the de-
fendant's claim that since Fox had upheld the state statute and he could be prosecuted
under it, the federal government was precluded from prosecuting him under the federal
statute. 50 U.S. (9 How.) at 569. Moore concerned a situation similar to Fox
involving state and federal statutes prohibiting the harboring and secreting of a negro
slave. Again the state prosecution was upheld. 55 U.S. (14 How.) at 21. However, in
none of these cases was a second prosecution actually attempted by the other sovereign.
17. 46 U.S. (5 How.) at 435.
18. 50 U.S. (9 How.) at 569, wherein the Court stated:
[T]he same act might, as to its character and tendencies, and the consequences it
involved, constitute an offense against both the State and Federal governments,
and might draw to its commission the penalties denounced by either, as appropriate
to its character in reference to each.
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may be liable to punishment for an infraction of the laws of either. The
same act may be an offense or transgression of the laws of both ....
That either or both may (if they see fit) punish such an offender,
cannot be doubted.'i
It is possible, however, to view these cases in light of their historical
environment. At the time these cases were decided state sovereignty was
a volatile issue, and the dicta regarding separate federal and state sover-
eignties in the area of criminal prosecution might be properly regarded
as a political damper rather than the embryo of a judicial precept. 20
Despite this foundational flaw, the concept of federalism, coupled with the
practical necessity of allowing both federal and state governments to
enforce their laws where there is concurrent jurisdiction, lends strong
support to the validity and viability of the dual sovereignty doctrine. It
was the dicta from Fox, Marigold, and Moore that provided the support
for the elucidation of this principle in United States v. Lanza,21 a decision
upholding a federal prosecution following a state conviction for the
same acts.
In Lanza, the majority opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Taft, promulgated
the principle:
[A] n act denounced as a crime by both national and state sovereignties
is an offense against the peace and dignity of both and may be
punished by each. 22
The Supreme Court, faced directly with the issue of successive prosecutions,
based its holding on dual sovereignty and held that prosecution by the
federal government following prosecution by the state for the same offense
did not constitute double jeopardy within the meaning of the fifth
amendment.23
The Lanza rule was subsequently affirmed by the Supreme Court in
Bartkus v. lllinois24 and Abbate v. United States,'2 5 which viewed together,
held the dual sovereignty doctrine applicable to both state prosecutions
following federal prosecutions and to federal prosecutions following state
19. 55 U.S. (14 How.) at 20.
20. Newman, supra note 12, at 260; Note, supra note 9, at 1541-42. The Marigold
Court indicated that its opinion regarding dual sovereignity was made "[w]ith the
view of avoiding conflict between the State and Federal jurisdictions ..... 50 U.S.
(9 How.) at 569.
21. 260 U.S. 377 (192-2). In Lanza, the defendants had been convicted under a
state liquor prohibition statute and subsequently indicted for violation of the National
Prohibition Act. Id. at 378-79.
22. Id. at 382. The Lanza principle was acknowledged in a number of subsequent
cases. See Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 108 (1945) ; Jerome v. United States,
318 U.S. 101, 105 (1943) ; Puerto Rico v. Shell Co., 302 U.S. 253, 264-66 (1937);
Westfall v. United States, 274 U.S. 256 (1927) ; Herbert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312
(1926).
23. 260 U.S. at 382.
24. 359 U.S. 121 (1959).
25. 359 U.S. 187 (1959).
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prosecutions. In Abbate, the defendants were convicted for violating a
state statute making it a crime to conspire to injure or destroy the property
of another. Subsequently, they were indicted for the same conspiracy
under a federal law making it a crime to conspire to violate section 1362
of the criminal code which forbade the injury or destruction of communica-
tion facilities operated or controlled by the United States Government. 26
Bartkus involved a defendant who was tried and acquitted in federal court
for violation of a federal statute making robbery of a federally insured
bank a federal offense. He was subsequently tried and convicted under the
state robbery statute for a violation which arose out of the same acts.27
In both cases, decided the same day, the subsequent prosecutions were
upheld by the Supreme Court on the basis of the dual sovereignty doctrine
as enunciated by the Lanza court.28 In rejecting the argument that due
process would be a bar to a second prosecution, justice Frankfurter,
writing for the majority in Bartkus, said:
It would be in derogation of our federal system to displace the reserved
power of States over state offenses by reason of prosecution of minor
federal offenses by federal authorities beyond the control of the States.29
This same idea was enunciated in the Court's opinion in Abbate.30
In the instant case, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was faced with
a strikingly similar fact situation to that presented in Bartkus.3 1 Appellant
Mills contended, however, that more recent decisions - namely, Elkins v.
United States3 2 and Murphy v. Waterfront Commission 3 - had the
effect of eroding the principle of dual sovereignty upon which Bartkus
26. Petitioners were involved in a plot to dynamite facilities of the Southern Bell
Telephone Company during a labor dispute. Id. at 188.
27. In Bartkus, the defendant was accused of the robbery of the federally insured
General Savings and Loan Association of Cicero, Illinois. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359
U.S. 121, 122 (1959).
28. Id. at 132; Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 194 (1959).
29. 359 U.S. at 137.
30. Justice Brennan stated:
[N]o one would suggest that, in order to maintain the effectiveness of federal law
enforcement, it is desirable completely to displace state power to prosecute crimes
based on acts which might also violate federal law.
359 U.S. at 195.
31. 447 Pa. at 166, 286 A.2d at 639. Both Bartkus and Mills had been tried in
federal court for robbing a federally insured bank, and both were subsequently prose-
cuted by the state in which the bank was located. See notes 2 & 25 and accompanying
text supra.
32. 364 U.S. 206 (1960). Elkins destroyed the "silver platter" doctrine by holding
that the federal government could not use evidence illegally obtained by state officials
in a federal prosecution, even though the evidence was the result of actions completely
independent of federal authority. Id. at 223-24. See generally Grant, The Tarnished
Silver Platter: Federalism and Admissibility of Illegally Seized Evidence, 8 U.C.L.A.L.
REV. 1 (1961).
33. 378 U.S. 52 (1964). Murphy held that a state witness could not be compelled
to give testimony by granting immunity from prosecution tinder state laws if the
testimony could be used against the witness in a federal court. Id. at 79. However,
the Court said such testimony, if given under grant of immunity, could not be used
against him in federal court. Id.
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relied. Appellant further contended that, subsequent to Benton v. Mary-
land,34 successive prosecutions for the same act were constitutionally
impermissible, an interpretation which would effectively overrule Bartkus.35
The Mills court rejected this view of Benton on the grounds that Benton
did not specifically overrule Bartkus36 and that the continued viability of
Bartkus was impliedly recognized in Waller v. Florida.3 T
However, the Mills court was compelled to refrain from a blind appli-
cation of the Bartkus holding because it felt that the Bartkus Court failed
to recognize and sufficiently examine the interests of the individual to be
free from being prosecuted and punished twice for the same offense when
the interests of the sovereign might be the same. 8 Instead, the Mills
opinion examined the penological justifications for successive prosecutions
and found little value in successive imprisonment of an individual in two
separate prisons for the same offense. 39 Justice Black's dissent in Bartkus
suggests that if additional punishment were the only justification for
successive prosecution by separate sovereigns, the conclusion must be that,
from the defendant's standpoint, there is little difference between the
interests of the state and federal jurisdictions regardless of who conducts
the initial prosecution.4 0  Therefore, the court promulgated a separate
interest test as a method of protecting the individual against being
prosecuted twice, while simultaneously preserving both federal and state
interests. 41
While the Mills court could have reached the same result had they
accepted the appellant's interpretation of the Benton case, they rejected
this interpretation and relied upon the Waller case as a reaffirmance of
Bartkus. However, the Waller Court's holding was predicated on a deter-
mination that municipal courts and state courts are separate arms of a
single sovereign, 42 thereby compelling the Court to rely on Grafton v.
United States43 rather than Abbate or Bartkus. Thus, the question of
34. 395 U.S. 784 (1969). See text accompanying note 8 supra.
35. 447 Pa. at 168, 286 A.2d at 640. The court noted that in State v. Fletcher,
22 Ohio App. 2d 83, 259 N.E.2d 146 (1970), the Ohio Court of Appeals had applied
this interpretation. However, the Ohio Supreme Court reversed on the grounds that
B rtkus was unaffected by Benton and should be strictly applied. State v. Fletcher,
26 Ohio St. 2d 221, 271 N.E.2d 567, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1024 (1972).
36. 447 Pa. at 168, 286 A.2d at 640.
37. 397 U.S. 387 (1970). In Waller, the defendant was tried and convicted in
a municipal court for destruction of city property and disorderly breach of the peace.
The State of Florida then attempted to try him on the charge of grand larceny for the
same acts. The Supreme Court held that the second trial was barred by the fifth
amendment since political subdivisions of a state are not considered separate sovereigns
for purposes of double prosecution. Id. at 395.
38. 447 Pa. at 169, 286 A.2d at 641.
39. Id. at 171, 286 A.2d at 641.
40. 359 U.S. at 155 (Black, J., dissenting).
41. 447 Pa. at 171-72, 286 A.2d at 642. See Note, supra note 9, at 1561; 45
CORNELL L.Q. 574 (1960).
42. 397 U.S. at 393.
43. 206 U.S. 333 (1907). In this case, the Court held that the territorial court
of the Philippine government and the United States federal courts must be considered
a single sovereign.
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successive prosecutions by separate sovereigns was not adequately raised
in the Waller case, and consequently, it is questionable authority for the
continuing force of the Bartkus holding.
The Mills opinion, however, is stronger in its treatment of the Elkins
and Murphy cases. While conceding that these cases might indicate some
erosion of the dual sovereignty doctrine, the Mills court, nevertheless,
limited their effect in the area of independent prosecutions by distinguishing
them. The court recognized that these cases involved attempts by the prose-
cuting jurisdiction to use the efforts of the other jurisdiction44 whereas uti-
lizing the dual sovereignty doctrine as a basis for allowing dual prosecutions
mandates the assumption of independent action by the separate sovereigns.45
This distinguishing factor seems especially valid when it is noted that the
Bartkus Court had taken particular care to note that the state and federal
prosecutions had been independently conducted.4 6  Therefore, it would
appear that the separate interest test, enunciated by the Mills court, can
only be applied when the prosecuting jurisdictions are acting independently
and are not considered to be separate jurisdictions within the same
sovereign. 47
Mr. Justice Barbieri dissented in the instant case on the grounds that
the separate interest test stated by the majority was "technically im-
practical and substantially fraught with unnecessary opportunities for
inequality in the treatment of offenders. ' 48  He felt that the trial court
would now be compelled to review the sentences imposed by a court of a
separate sovereign whenever a plea of double jeopardy is raised.49 Sig-
nificantly, he raised questions concerning only the protection of the Com-
monwealth's interests in the situation where a prior conviction has been
set aside or significantly altered.50 Moreover, Justice Barbieri seemed
to imply that the interests of the Commonwealth, however defined, could
44. 447 Pa. at 167-68, 286 A.2d at 640.
45. A high degree of cooperation between the prosecuting jurisdictions places the
accused in the position of being effectively tried twice by the same sovereign. 359 U.S.
at 168-69 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
46. Id. at 122-24. While conceding that the record showed some degree of
cooperation between federal and state officials, the Bartkus majority felt it was in-
sufficient to support the conclusion "that the state trial was a sham and a cover for a
federal prosecution, and thereby in essential fact another federal prosecution." Id. at 124.
47. Such a limitation would apparently allay the fears expressed by Justice
Brennan in Abbate. Although he wrote the majority opinion, he felt compelled to issue
a separate opinion specifically rejecting the separate interest test urged by the Govern-
ment as an alternative ground for the Court's decision. 359 U.S. at 196. He was
primarily concerned that the separate interest test, if applied to uphold two successive
federal prosecutions for the same offense, would be clearly violative of the fifth
amendment:
I think not violence to, but virtual extinction of, the guarantee [against double
jeopardy] results if the Federal Government may try people over and over again
for the same criminal conduct just because each trial is based on a different statute
protecting a separate federal interest.
Id. at 201.
48. 447 Pa. at 175, 286 A.2d at 643 (Barbieri, J., dissenting).
49. Id. at 175, 286 A.2d at 644.
50. Id. at 176, 286 A.2d at 644.
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be protected only by a determination of guilt and imposition of appropriate
punishment, indicating that the only factor the trial court need consider
is the degree of punishment. 51 It is submitted that such an interpretation
fails to appreciate the purpose of the separate interest test as applied to
effectuate the underlying theme of the double jeopardy doctrine, namely,
to prevent one from being placed in jeopardy twice, not merely to prevent
one from being convicted twice.52
Justice Barbieri was additionally concerned that, when a defendant
is confronted with the possibility of two prosecutions, inequality of treatment
might arise, depending upon which jurisdiction prosecuted the defendant
initially. 53 While the state might be precluded from initiating a second
prosecution following the federal adjudication, the federal prosecution has
no such constraint following a state prosecution. This, therefore, places
added pressure upon a defendant to plead guilty to a federal indictment
before the state initiates its prosecution. However, this danger has been
minimized to a great extent by the announced policy of the United States
Department of Justice - a federal prosecution should not be conducted
after a state prosecution has been completed unless there is some compelling
reason for proceeding with the second prosecution.5 4 Although this policy
does not have the legislative or judicial sanction required to completely
eliminate this pressure on the defendant, it should provide some means
for mitigating such pressure.
What the Mills court failed to do, however, was to identify specifically
what state and federal interests should be examined and what guidelines
should be utilized. Differing interests might be found in the legislative
purpose behind the enactment of a particular statute5 5 or in the purpose
of the sanction imposed for violation of the statute.5 6 With respect to
potential guidelines, an examination of the approaches taken by other
states might prove beneficial. For example, a number of states have
enacted statutes expressly forbidding successive prosecution in their courts
after jeopardy has attached in a federal court,5 7 while a number of other
51. Id. at 175-76, 286 A.2d at 644.
52. Implicit in a discussion of double jeopardy is the notion that the policies
underlying the doctrine are applicable regardless of the verdict in the first trial. See
Fisher, supra note 11, at 592.
53. 447 Pa. at 176, 286 A.2d at 644 (Barbieri, J., dissenting).
54. The policy against duplicating federal-state prosecutions was formally an-
nounced by the United States Attorney General in a memorandum on April 6, 1959.
27 U.S.L.W. 2509.
55. For example, in Abbate, there was a separate and distinct federal interestinvolved in protecting interstate communication facilities quite apart from the state's
interest in protecting each citizen's property from damage by another. See note 26
and accompanying text supra. The separate interest test could have been applied to
reach the same result as the Abbate court did. But see note 47 and accompanying
text supra.
56. In this regard, the State of Illinois had a peculiar interest in Bartkus because
a felony conviction by the state exposed him to life imprisonment under the Illinois
Habitual Criminal Statute. 359 U.S. at 122.
57. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-146 (1956); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§43-1224.1-.3 (1964); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 656, 793 (West 1970); GA. CODE ANN.§ 26-507(c) (1969); MINN. STAT. § 609.45 (1969); N.Y. CRIM. PRO. LAW § 40.20
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states have statutes which can be construed by implication to bar subse-
quent prosecutions by the state.5" In this regard, a bill was recently
introduced in the Pennsylvania General Assembly which would lend
support for and, to some degree, codify the Mills holding.59
A significant problem in applying the separate interest test is deter-
mining how much weight must be given to these particular state interests
when they are balanced against individual rights. The court gives some
guidance by enunciating the policies underlying the double jeopardy pro-
scription; the prosecution should not be used simply to increase the chance
of conviction by placing the case before another jury, to search for a
more severe sentence, or to badger individuals. ° If any of these motives
permeate the decision to initiate a second prosecution for the same offense,
such a prosecution would violate the spirit of the double jeopardy pro-
scription and should be barred.6 1 Even in the absence of what might be
deemed improper motive, there still exists the individual's right to be
free from double prosecution and to have his verdict be final.0 2 It is in
consideration of these rights that the Mills holding requires a positive
showing by the Commonwealth that its interests in the second prosecution
are substantially different from the interests protected by the initial
prosecution.
0 3
By placing the burden on the Commonwealth, an additional considera-
tion is required of the prosecutor in deciding whether a certain case
should go to trial. Arguably, the prosecutor already makes similar con-
siderations at the various investigatory and pre-trial stages of a criminal
prosecution. However, at these procedural stages, his focus is directed
toward determining whether there is sufficient evidence to convict, not
whether the protection of the Commonwealth's interests might not require
(McKinney 1971); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 25 (1961); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.1-259
(1960).
58. See, e.g., HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 706-1, 706-4 (1968); Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 2432 (1957) ; MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 94-4703 (1969) ; NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 171.070,
208.020 (1971); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12-O5-05, 29-03-13 (1960); ORE. REV. STAT.
§ 131.240(1) (1971); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. §§ 22-2-13, 22-5-8 (1967); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 77-8-8 (1953) ; Wis. STAT. ANN. § 939.71 (1958).
59. For example, this bill would obviate the necessity of considering the outcome
of the initial prosecution by focusing on the intent of the statutes involved. S.B. 45,
Pa. Gen. Assembly, 1972 Sess., § 111. This section provides in pertinent part:
When conduct constitutes an offense within the concurrent jurisdiction of this
Commonwealth and of the United States or another State, a prosecution in any
such other jurisdiction is a bar to a subsequent prosecution in this Commonwealth
under the following circumstances:
(1) The first prosecution resulted in an acquittal or in a conviction . . . and
the subsequent prosecution is based on the same conduct unless:
(i) the offense of which the defendant was formerly convicted and the
offense for which he is subsequently prosecuted each requires proof of a fact not
required by the other and the law defining each of such offense is intended to
prevent a substantially different harm or evil . . ..
60. 447 Pa. at 169-70, 286 A.2d at 641.
61. Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 198-99 (Brennan, J., separate opinion).
62. 447 Pa. at 171, 286 A.2d at 641-42.
63. Id. at 171-72, 286 A.2d at 642.
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prosecution regardless of the guilt of the accused. Unfortunately, because
of the lack of specific guidelines, the prosecutor's discretion at this point
is virtually unchecked. 64
Initially, then, the general criteria for determining whether to proceed
to trial will evolve from the policies made by the prosecuting attorney's
office. With the prosecutor's decision to proceed being subject to review
at the trial level,", it is expected that more specific guidelines will be
developed through judicial decisions. This approach would appear to be
in keeping with the spirit of the Bartkus decision in which Justice Frank-
furter, recognizing the difficulty of determining when state and federal
statutes are so similar that a prosecution under one should bar a prosecution
under the other, said:
The proper solution of that problem frequently depends upon a judg-
ment of the gravamen of the state statute. It depends also upon an
understanding of the scope of the bar that has been historically granted
in the State to prevent successive state prosecutions. Both these
problems are ones with which the States are obviously more competent
to deal than is this Court. Furthermore, the rules resulting will
intimately affect the efforts of a State to develop a rational and just
bodv of criminal law in the protection of its citizens. 66
The separate interest doctrine is now established as the rule in
Pennsylvania in cases of state prosecution following a federal prosecution. 67
It will not, of course, eliminate dual prosecutions, but it should reduce
considerably the number of cases that can be prosecuted by the state
subsequent to a federal adjudication. The approach of the Mills court,
in barring the second prosecution, indicates a conscientious effort to apply
the spirit of the double jeopardy proscription.
Of course, it remains to be seen whether other state courts will
follow Pennsylvania's lead in the absence of legislative action setting forth
guidelines. Indeed, the majority opinion in Mills can easily be criticized
for the obvious lack of specificity in establishing guidelines for the state's
prosecutors. Nevertheless, this deficiency may prove to be the strength
of the court's holding in that it will allow a judicial development of
guidelines to remain sensitive to societal demands in an area vitally
dependent upon the dynamic concept of individual rights.
Ronald J. Examitas
64. For an analysis of prosecutorial discretion in the double jeopardy area, see J.
SIGLER, DOUBLE JEOPARDY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF A LEGAL AND SOCIAL POLICY 155-87(1969).
65. By statute, Pennsylvania makes this review available through the plea of
autrefois convict or acquit. PA. STAT. tit. 19, § 464 (1964). See note 4 supra.
66. 359 U.S. at 138.
67. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court accorded full retroactivity to the Mills
decision in Commonwealth v. Pope, 447 Pa. 576, 287 A.2d 902 (1972).
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